With more than a decade having now passed since the financial crises, we can reach some (at least tentative) judgements about the progress of regionalism in East Asia. Questions relating to institutional design should be central to this evaluation. East Asian regional institutions have not been well-served by following the ASEAN model. Although ASEAN is the great survivor among East Asian regional institutions, a significant factor in its longevity is the lack of constraints that its member states have been willing to accept. No integration agreement will be effective if members can choose to ignore their commitments and suffer no consequences from their failure to comply with agreements they have voluntarily joined.
Two other factors compound the problems arising from ineffective institutional design: rivalry between China and Japan for influence in the region; and debate over what the relevant geographical scope of the region should be. The ASEAN+3 group has received a great deal of attention but, because of rivalry between the Northeast Asian members, most of its cooperation occurs on an 'ASEAN+1' basis.
Trade and financial data suggest that East Asia has not become more regionalised since the mid-1990s. Neither is there any evidence of increasing popular identity with 'East Asia' as an entity. 1 I use East Asia here as shorthand for the states that became participants in the ASEAN+3 process (i.e., the ten member states of ASEAN-Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam-plus China, Japan and Korea). Clearly, there is nothing 'natural' about this regional grouping-for instance, it excludes East Asia's fourth largest (after China, Japan and Korea) economy, Taiwan. I share the widely-held view that regions are social constructions created by political elites. As Peter J. Katzenstein, A World of Regions: Asia and Europe in the American Imperium (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005), pp. 10, 21, 36 suggests, 'regions have both material and ideational dimensions … regions are the creation of political power and purpose … "given" by geography and "made" through politics. ' preferential trade agreements (PTAs), in another alimentary analogy, constitute a 'noodle bowl' that detractors believe complicates the operations of production networks.
With more than a decade having now passed since the financial crises, we can reach some (at least tentative) judgements about the progress of regionalism in East Asia. And we have data available to assess to what extent regionalisation (economic integration within the region) has moved in a way that would conventionally be perceived to be supportive of closer regionalism (inter-governmental collaboration on a geographically restricted basis). But by what criteria should East Asian regional institutions be evaluated? Officials from governments and regional institutions in East Asia contend reasonably that their efforts should not be judged by reference to the European experience, 3 an argument accepted by sophisticated scholars of East Asian regionalism. 4 But assertions, made in some official circles, that the 'soft' regionalism of East Asia is all about process ('confidencebuilding') rather than outcomes are increasingly untenable in an era when regional efforts at functional cooperation have proliferated, and political elites have expressed growing frustration at the failure of institutions to perform the tasks for which they were intended. To suggest that institutional design matters is not to argue that European Union (EU) institutions must be mimicked in other parts of the world if regionalism is to be effective there. 5 Political choices that shape design of regional institutions do, however, have consequences for their effectiveness. Former Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad proclaimed that the objective of East Asian regionalism in contrast to its European counterpart was to 'build … a Pacific Gemeinschaft, a Pacific village or family or group of friends, not an artificial, Cartesian construct-over-legalistic, overstructured and over-institutionalised'. Quoted in Pauline Kerr, 'The Security Dialogue in the AsiaPacific ', Pacific Review, 7(4) 1994, pp. 407-8. This review of developments in regionalism in the last decade begins with an analysis of the factors that led to the establishment of an East Asia-wide grouping. I then assess developments within ASEAN because this institution remains central to broader cooperation in East Asia. As the region's only surviving institution, ASEAN, almost by default, was the platform (a 'natural core') when efforts began to construct an East Asia-wide institution. 6 Moreover, given the ongoing political tensions between China and Japan, both found it convenient to have ASEAN at least nominally as the 'driving force' behind East Asian integration. And, with ASEAN at the centre, the nascent East Asian institutions have inevitably inherited the strengths and weaknesses of its approach to regional collaboration. The last part of this contribution assesses the progress of these broader groupings, and whether the context in which intergovernmental collaboration occurs in East Asia has become more supportive of regionalism in the last decade.
THE FINANCIAL CRISES AND THE ORIGINS OF EAST ASIAN REGIONALISM
The idea of an East Asian 'region' is of relatively recent origin. As Paul Evans points out, although the Chinese tributary system and the Japanese Great East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere were both organised on an East Asia-wide basis, conceptualisations of 'East Asia' in the post-1945 period typically referred to countries of Confucian heritage-with 'East Asia' (essentially the three Chinas-the People's Republic, Hong Kong, and Taiwan-Japan and Korea) and 'Southeast Asia' being seen as distinctive regions, a division reflected in many universities that housed centres for 'East and Southeast Asian studies '. 7 Two developments in the second half of the 1980s paved the way for the revival of conceptions of East Asia as embracing the territories from northwestern China to the southeastern tip of the Indonesian archipelago. The first was the end of the Cold War, which had long impeded economic collaboration among countries in Northeast Asia and in Southeast Asia, and across the Pacific. It was only with the waning of the Cold War, the cessation of hostilities in Vietnam and subsequently between Vietnam and its neighbours, and China's opening to the global economy, that the construction of a regionwide inter-governmental institution became possible. 8 The second was the rapid expansion of economic linkages between Northeast and Southeast Asian economies that followed the G7's Plaza Accord of 1985. New intra-regional production networks developed, driven by a sharp increase in investment from Japan, Korea and Taiwan in Southeast Asian economies. 9 Initially, however, the principal basis for inter-governmental collaboration that emerged was transregional rather than confined to the East Asian geographical region. The Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) grouping was founded in 1989, and built on several decades of efforts by academics, state officials, and business leaders to establish an inter-governmental institution to supplement their networks and meetings, where state officials participated in a private capacity. 10 exerted pressure on its principal regional ally, Japan, not to sign on to the Malaysian idea. 12 Mahathir's proposal was watered down to an 'East Asian Economic Caucus' (EAEC) that operated within rather than as an alternative to APEC. The idea of an exclusively East Asian grouping did not disappear, however. Its first concrete realisation came with the establishment of the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM), a biennial dialogue between East Asian states and the EU, first proposed by Singapore's Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong in 1994. 13 As Richard Stubbs notes, the requirement for Northeast Asian ministers and officials to get together with their Southeast Asian counterparts to coordinate their positions in advance of their meetings with the EU 'proved to be the catalyst that turned the EAEC into the APT [ASEAN+3]-a functioning if somewhat embryonic-East Asian regional cooperative arrangement '. 14 The financial crises of 1997-98 pushed ASEAN+3 out of the cosy but restricted womb of ASEM. The crises were significant in exposing the weaknesses of existing regional institutions, in exacerbating the divisions between East Asian and 'Western' members of the principal transregional organisation, APEC, in providing a new foundation for 'East Asian' solidarity, and in identifying an agenda where East Asian states might pursue practical cooperation.
Neither of the two major regional groupings-ASEAN and APECresponded effectively to the financial crisis. ASEAN had in place an arrangement for a limited swapping of foreign currency reserves among its members but this was totally inadequate in the face of the magnitude of the financial flows that precipitated the 1997-98 crises. APEC, with its much larger membership, was better placed in principle to provide more substantial assistance to the crisis economies but its Western members preferred to leave the issue in the hands of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). APEC's ineffective response to the financial crises occurred simultaneously with an attempt led by its Western members, through the adoption of a program of sectoral trade liberalisation, to move it away from informal processes of unilateralism and voluntarism towards a rules-based institution. The consequence was that the composition of the principal coalitions within APEC changed: whereas the Japanese government had previously supported Western attempts to give APEC a more ambitious agenda, Tokyo now sided with China and most ASEAN economies in seeking to confine APEC to its original modus operandi. 15 The frustration with Western governments was exacerbated by what was perceived as their unsympathetic response to the difficulties the region faced in 1997, the limited assistance that the US offered being unfavourably compared with its bail-out of Mexico in 1995.
Although the initial Japanese proposal for an Asian Monetary Fund failed, as much because of opposition from Beijing (which was unhappy at the failure of Tokyo to consult it) as from Washington, the vulnerabilities that the crisis had exposed prompted further proposals in this field. At the ASEAN+3 Summit in November 1999, leaders agreed to enhance 'self-help and support mechanisms in East Asia' through the ASEAN+3 framework. Following on the Asian Development Bank's annual meeting held in May 2000 in Chiang Mai, Thailand, the finance ministers of the ASEAN+3 countries agreed to establish a scheme that would provide for a swapping of foreign currency reserves when local currencies came under attack. The Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI), as it became known, discussed in more detail later, remains the most prominent example of cooperation at the ASEAN+3 level. The Study Group put forward seventeen short-term measures to pursue the East Asian vision of 'peace, prosperity and progress' and identified a further nine medium to long-term 'concrete measures'. According to the ASEAN Secretariat website, at the end of 2007 the ASEAN+3 process embraced forty-eight mechanisms for cooperation across sixteen areas including economic, financial and monetary affairs, political and security issues, tourism, agriculture, environment, energy and information technology. 16 On paper, at least, East Asian regionalism appears to have taken off. Moreover, East Asian countries were actively negotiating bilateral and minilateral PTAs. Whereas at the time of the financial crisis only one PTA, the ASEAN Free Trade Agreement (AFTA), was in operation in East Asia, a decade later over forty such arrangements were being implemented, with a similar number being negotiated or under study. The issue remains, however, of how much substance underlies this burgeoning activity.
ASEAN FORTY-PLUS YEARS ON
Seldom is scholarly opinion on the effectiveness of an international institution so divided as it is in the case of ASEAN. At the one end of the spectrum are those who, at their most caustic, castigate ASEAN for 'making process, not progress', and assert that it is essentially an 'ersatz' institution whose claims to have established a community are nothing more than an 'illusion'. 17 At the other extreme are those who appear to have uncritically accepted the hyperbole of official statements (in some cases these academics are closely associated with governments in the region or officially-supported Track Two institutions), and argue that not only has ASEAN created a diplomatic community but laid strong foundations for a security community, and that it has devised its own unique format for inter-state interactions that provides a superior model for regionalism among less developed economies than is offered by 'Western' rules-based legalism. 18 Most scholars of ASEAN succumb neither to vitriol nor to uncritical acceptance of official hyperbole; they nonetheless typically divide into two camps-the ASEAN sceptics, and the ASEAN boosters, terminology I shall use through this contribution. Underlying these alternative conclusions on ASEAN's effectiveness are differences in epistemology, ontology and methodology. Broadly speaking, the alternative views on ASEAN coincide with realist and constructivist approaches. 19 Realist approaches to ASEAN have a long pedigree, going back to the work of Michael Leifer. 20 That constructivist approaches have figured so prominently in the recent analysis of ASEAN owes much to the pioneering work of Amitav Acharya, a leading constructivist scholar. 21 For Acharya, the essence of the 'ASEAN way' is that it is a 'process of regional interactions and cooperation based on discreteness, informality, consensus building and non-confrontational bargaining styles' that contrasts with 'the adversarial posturing, majority vote and other legalistic decisionmaking procedures in Western multilateral organizations'. 22 For ASEAN boosters, its informal operating procedures have had two principal merits. These procedures (supported by the norms of respect for sovereignty, and commitment to settlement of disputes by peaceful means, enshrined in ASEAN's Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC)) have built confidence among states that were previously in conflict with one another, thereby generating a sense of community (and a consequent willingness to cooperate). And, by permitting states to choose which regional commitments they are willing to undertake (an n -x procedure), they have enabled cooperation to be realised that would otherwise be impossible. 23 ASEAN boosters, in other words, make a virtue out of what sceptics see as near fatal flaws in ASEAN's institutional design-agreements that are not enforced, and regional institutions that lack any authority. 24 For the most part, ASEAN boosters and sceptics, when they have not been lobbing invective towards those that do not share their views, have simply talked past one another. Yet, as Donald K. Emmerson argues in a perceptive contribution on whether ASEAN should be considered a security community, it should be possible to operationalise the arguments of the two sides such that they can be subjected to empirical testing. 25 Ultimately, one cannot test the counterfactual-how would the region have developed in the absence of ASEAN or in circumstances where a more rules-oriented regional institution was in place-but at least we should be able to subject the competing arguments to some 'plausibility probes'.
An appropriate starting point is to examine what ASEAN boosters see as its major accomplishments. In a piece written to commemorate ASEAN's fortieth anniversary, Acharya identified four 'areas of accomplishment': first, it survived as Asia's only multipurpose regional organisation; second, since its foundation no ASEAN member has been involved in a major armed confrontation with another member state; third, ASEAN was instrumental in concluding the conflict between Cambodia and Vietnam at the end of the 1980s; and, finally, ASEAN played an important role in integrating China into regional institutions, and has provided the platform on which East Asia-wide regional institutions have been built. 26 Yuen Foong Khong and Helen Nesadurai give the last of these points more focus by arguing that one of ASEAN's major accomplishments has been to persuade other countries to sign on to its TAC. 27 To point to ASEAN's relative longevity is to wield something of a double-edged sword. ASEAN has survived where other regional institutions-both within Southeast Asia, such as SEATO and MAPHILINDO, 28 and among other developing countries-failed. Survival in itself, however, tells one little about the effectiveness of an organisation. Reminders of ASEAN's longevity also invite comparisons with the EU, which has been in existence only ten years longer than ASEAN, and with the achievements of younger regional groupings among less developed economies, comparisons that, as we will see below, do not always work in ASEAN's favour.
The second of ASEAN's accomplishments that Acharya identifies-that no ASEAN state has engaged in a major armed confrontation with another member since ASEAN's foundation-is the issue that over the years has attracted most commentary. For ASEAN boosters, the absence of major intra-regional armed conflict points to ASEAN's having become at least a 'nascent' security community in the Deutschian sense-the attainment of a sense of community sufficiently strong and widespread to assure peaceful change among its members with reasonable certainty in the foreseeable future. 29 Leaving aside for the moment the issue of whether or not ASEAN has succeeded in creating a community-and, if so, of what sort-a key question is whether the correlation between ASEAN's existence and the absence of intra-regional conflict also contains a causal relationship and, if so, in which direction causality runs. For realists, the absence of conflict in Southeast Asia owes as much to extra-regional power balances as to anything happening within the region itself. 30 But besides the influence of great powers on the region, other factors than ASEAN itself might have contributed to the absence of intra-regional armed conflict. The regional peace may have resulted from conventional deterrence and/or utilitarian calculations by state elites that any potential gains from inter-state conflict would have failed to outweigh the costs, especially for states that are heavily dependent on foreign trade (and often inward foreign direct investment). The last forty years, after all, have witnessed inter-state conflict worldwide decline-and an enduring peace has characterised other regions besides ASEAN that are comprised primarily of developing economies. 31 At the very least, explanations for regional peace in Southeast Asia that rest on ideational factors need to be supplemented by materialist explanations.
And was it ASEAN that produced a change in behaviour among its member states or a prior change in state behaviour that permitted the creation of ASEAN in the first place? As Khong and Nesadurai note, whereas relations among Southeast Asian states in the first half of the 1960s had been characterised by refusals to grant recognition and thus legitimacy to neighbours, and by irredentism and support for secessionist movements, 'by 1967 [the year of ASEAN's foundation], governments of the day in these five regional states had come to realize that such forms of behavior were decidedly unproductive and costly to national governments'. 32 The absence of intra-regional conflict in itself does not provide strong support for the existence of an ASEAN security community. Indeed, the problem for ASEAN boosters is to provide evidence of the existence and impact of such a community in a non-tautological manner. existence of an 'ASEAN way' of institutional design and interaction, or to a particular discourse, is insufficient. Most commentators would accept that an ASEAN diplomatic community does exist-one would not expect otherwise for an institution that now organises close to 700 meetings per year for national officials, ministers and leaders. But evidence that this proliferation of activity has led to a change in attitudes and behaviour among political elites is much more difficult to find.
In a rare attempt to examine systematically the impact of ASEAN norms on its member states' behaviour, Tobias Nischalke found that the record was decidedly mixed. 33 In particular, he saw little evidence in the behaviour of ASEAN states in the security sphere to suggest that a shared identity existed among them. They continued to depend primarily on extra-regional alliances for the ultimate guarantee of their security. 34 Of equal significance are the findings of several authors that political elites in ASEAN countries continue to conceive of intra-regional security relations primarily in terms of deterrence. 35 Further support is provided by Christopher Roberts in one of the few systematic surveys undertaken of elite opinion in ASEAN. Close to 60 per cent of his sample said that they could not trust other countries in Southeast Asia to be 'good neighbours'. Only one-half of the sample was 'sure' that there were no circumstances in which they could envisage armed conflict between two or more ASEAN states. 36 Elites in Singapore and Thailand, two of the region's more developed economies, were least certain that there would be no intra-ASEAN conflict in the next twenty years. significant but the type of weaponry that ASEAN states are acquiring. As Robert Hartfiel and Brian L. Job note, although states in the region do not (officially) identify one another as security threats, placing emphasis instead on 'internal' threats, 'many of the weapons systems being accumulated by the region's armed forces are externally oriented; that is, they are designed for conventional interstate warfare'. They express concern that the current pace of weapons acquisition may trigger a regional arms race. 37 Even if one makes the (often unpersuasive) case that such weapons are not intended to deter ASEAN neighbours, such acquisitions lend little support to the idea that a broader 'East Asian' community is coming into being.
Of the other ASEAN accomplishments that Acharya lists, space precludes a detailed discussion of ASEAN's role in the settlement of the conflict between Vietnam and Cambodia. While the initial phases of the Cambodian crisis did mark a high spot for ASEAN's diplomacy, lending support to arguments that ASEAN performs best when its existence or prosperity is under threat, 38 ASEAN unity soon broke down as various members pursued unilateral initiatives. It took great power intervention under UN auspices to bring an eventual settlement to the conflict. 39 Turning to the final claim on ASEAN's centrality to the broader process of East Asian integration and especially China's accession to regional institutions: China has undoubtedly been comfortable with the 'ASEAN way' of interaction, and this may have encouraged Beijing to join the ASEAN Regional Forum. Again, however, there is a risk in overstating the significance of ASEAN to China's involvement in regional institutions. This was an era when China was keen to join all manner of regional and global institutions, to reclaim what its leaders saw as its rightful place in global politics, and within regional institutions to balance the influence of Japan. And the modus operandi of some of the institutions that China was happy to join, such as the World Trade Organization (WTO), was far removed from the 'ASEAN way'.
As noted earlier, ASEAN has indeed served as the platform on which regionwide institutions have been built especially since the financial crises, although not without concern frequently being expressed that ASEAN's centrality in, for instance, the region's primary security institution, the ASEAN Regional Forum, has been a major factor in its ineffectiveness. What of the claim that the extension of ASEAN's TAC has significance because an 'increasing number of Asian-Pacific states seem willing to abide by a code of regional conduct that has been conducive to peace and stability'. 40 Some scepticism about the commitment and motivations of recent signatories to the TAC is necessary, however, because ASEAN Foreign Ministers made accession to the Treaty one of the three prerequisites if states were to be invited to the first EAS to be held in 2005.
The Australian government, for instance, had previously refused to sign the TAC; but now realising that it had no choice if it was to receive an invitation to the first EAS, it sought accession-on the condition, however, that an 'understanding' of its obligations under the Treaty was spelled out. This occurred through an exchange of letters between the Australian Foreign Minister and his Lao counterpart (Laos then holding the chair of ASEAN's standing committee). The Australian Foreign Minister's letter read:
the Australian Government, in taking the decision to accede to the Treaty, is pleased to note the following understandings of key provisions of the Treaty, on a non-prejudice basis to ASEAN. First, Australia's accession to the Treaty would not affect Australia's obligations under other bilateral or multilateral agreements. Second, the Treaty is to be interpreted in conformity with the United Nations Charter, and Australia's accession would not affect Australia's rights and obligations arising from the Charter of the United Nations. Further, the Treaty will not apply to, nor affect, Australia's relationships with states outside South-East Asia. In short, at best the TAC would only apply to Australia's relations with the states of ASEAN rather than the broader East Asian region embraced by the EAS, and then would be subordinated to Australia's obligations under the UN Charter and to its alliances. A similar understanding that accession to the TAC would not affect their alliance commitments was negotiated by Japan and South Korea.
Ineffective functional cooperation
Acharya's list of ASEAN's accomplishments lacks reference to its extensive activities in pursuit of economic integration and other areas of functional cooperation. At one level this is curious. Although ASEAN has, like many other regional groupings, regarded economic integration as a means to a more significant end, the construction of peaceful relations between member states, an economic community was one of the 'three pillars' of the ASEAN community that member states committed themselves, in the Bali Concord II of October 2003, to establish by 2020. Moreover, the area of economic cooperation provides measures by which ASEAN's performance can be judged, not just in relation to the goals that members have set for themselves but also in comparison with the achievements of other regional institutions, and affords an opportunity to assess the effectiveness of ASEAN's institutional design. 42 The commitment to construct an ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) built on resolutions passed at the Second Informal ASEAN summit in Malaysia in December 1997, in the wake of the financial crisis, to fully implement the ASEAN Free Trade Area (launched in 1992 in response to the perceived economic threat to the region from China), to accelerate the liberalisation of trade in services, and to free the flow of investments by 2020. At the twelfth ASEAN summit in Cebu, the Philippines, in January 2007, members agreed to advance the completion date for the AEC to 2015. ASEAN had begun to implement its free trade agreement in 1993. In the years following the original adoption of this objective, the good intentions to promote economic cooperation were undermined by a lack of precision of the obligations that members had agreed to, by frequent changes of target dates for implementation, which caused uncertainty for investors, and by the failure of members to honour the commitments they had made. 43 ASEAN's definition of free trade was an unusual one-the implementation of tariffs that were in the zero to 5 per cent range (the top of this range being above the average tariff level that industrialised countries would impose on imports of manufactures once they fully implemented the WTO's Uruguay Round commitments). The lack of uniformity in treatment of individual products by various ASEAN countries caused traders to face in effect not a preferential margins created by AFTA for the vast majority of intra-ASEAN trade were so low, following the unilateral trade liberalisation ASEAN states pursued in the 1980s and 1990s, that few companies found that their potential benefits offset the risk of delays and the costs of completing the paperwork required to comply with the treaty's rules of origins. Scarcely surprising, therefore, that various studies have shown that only a tiny percentage of intra-ASEAN trade took advantage of the preferential tariffs created by AFTA-typically less than 5 per cent of overall trade, a much smaller percentage than for preferential arrangements in other parts of the world. 45 Progress in other areas of economic collaboration was even less impressive than in the removal of tariffs on merchandise trade. In an era of generally low tariffs, 'beyond-border' barriers are often more significant obstacles to trade than are tariffs themselves. ASEAN has neglected to address these issues seriously. Members failed to meet a 2005 deadline for agreement on criteria for identifying non-tariff barriers. In the services sector, little progress on liberalisation had occurred despite the signature in 1995 of an ASEAN Framework Agreement on Services. As a consequence, growth of services trade within ASEAN was slower than the world average-in marked contrast to trade in goods. 46 ASEAN's progress on economic integration accordingly paled in comparison not only with that achieved within the EU but also with that in other less ambitious integrative arrangements such as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and, perhaps more surprisingly, MERCOSUR (the Southern Common Market). The latter has moved more quickly than ASEAN on the elimination of tariffs and non-tariff barriers, on providing national treatment for service exports, and on harmonisation of competition law. 47 In contrast to the dramatic changes in trade wrought by NAFTA, AFTA had a minimal effect on the region's economic development.
While ASEAN has made progress in institutionalizing economic cooperation, it has been painfully slow. Nesadurai notes, in the most comprehensive study of ASEAN's economic cooperation to date, that some clarification of ASEAN rules did emerge from inter-state disputes over the implementation of economic cooperation-but often such clarification was accompanied by a downward revision of the original targets. 48 In other areas of functional cooperation, for instance, on environmental problems, the outcomes have been equally disappointing. 49 The ineffectiveness of ASEAN cooperation goes hand-in-hand with the weakness of ASEAN institutions. As Khong and Nesadurai conclude, the ASEAN way 'encouraged talk-shops, lowest common denominator agreements, while making defection and cheating costless because there were no sanctions'. 50 These flaws in ASEAN's institutional design have been widely recognised-by constructivist and realist academic commentators alike, as well as by many officials in the region.
Recognition that changes were needed in ASEAN's institutional design led to the appointment in 2005 of an Eminent Persons Group (EPG) to come up with ideas for an 'ASEAN Charter'. In its report, the EPG asserted that ASEAN needed to 'reposition itself' in response to 'the growing challenges and opportunities of regional integration', and that: ASEAN's problem is not one of lack of vision, ideas, or action plans. The problem is one of ensuring compliance and effective implementation. ASEAN must have a culture of commitment to honour and implement decisions, agreements and timelines. 51 In particular, the EPG emphasised the need for effective dispute settlement mechanisms, and that ASEAN should be empowered to redress serious breaches of commitments to ASEAN's agreements. By the time, however, that the EPG recommendations had passed through the hands of an ASEAN-level High Level Task Force and then subjected to the scrutiny of member states, they were substantially watered down. Although the ASEAN Secretariat was given enhanced responsibilities for monitoring progress on economic integration, the provisions for punishing noncompliance that the EPG had recommended were removed, and the Charter specifically makes allowance for an 'ASEAN Minus X' procedure whereby members are permitted to opt out of economic commitments. 52 The issue here is not that ASEAN needs to move to European supranationalism for its efforts at economic integration to be more effective. Over the years ASEAN members appear to have confused an aversion to supranationalism with an unwillingness to accept specific binding commitments voluntarily entered into. Most ASEAN states are now members of the WTO, and many have entered legally binding free trade agreement commitments with industrialised economies. There is more than a little irony when they are willing voluntarily to sign on to these agreements with extra-regional actors but maintain a reluctance to commit themselves to similar agreements within ASEAN itself-thereby undermining the much-vaunted 'ASEAN First' principle. There is nothing in a free trade agreement that requires supranationalism-even dispute settlement mechanisms can be handled, albeit with debatable effectiveness, by national secretariats, as occurs in NAFTA. But no economic integration agreement will be effective if members can choose to ignore their commitments and suffer no consequences from their failure to comply with 51 Eminent Persons Group on the ASEAN Charter, 'Report of the Eminent Persons Group on the ASEAN Charter' (Jakarta: ASEAN Secretariat, 2006), p. 4. 52 At the time of writing (April 2008), it was unclear whether ASEAN's two most vibrant democracies, Indonesia and the Philippines, would ratify the Charter because of widespread disappointment at its re-affirmation of traditional ASEAN values of non-intervention in the affairs of member states, and its lack of commitment to liberal democracy. With the growth in significance of civil society groups in the region's more democratic countries, ASEAN's 'democratic deficit' is receiving increasing attention.
agreements they have voluntarily joined. An enormous distance has still to be travelled before ASEAN will have a set of agreements that are sufficiently specific that they could conceivably be legally enforceable-let alone mechanisms to provide this enforcement.
INSTITUTIONALISING THE EAST ASIAN REGION
With ASEAN as the 'driving force' for broader East Asian regionalism, and the 'ASEAN way' enshrined as the modus operandi for regional institutions, many commentators have been sceptical of the potential efficacy of the East Asia cooperation process that has developed since the financial crises. This scepticism has been compounded by two other (inter-related) factors: rivalry between China and Japan for influence in the region, and the re-emergence of the debate over what the relevant geographical scope of an East Asian region should be.
Sceptics were confounded, however, when the finance ministers of the ASEAN+3 grouping agreed on mechanisms to coordinate bilateral currency swap arrangements through the Chiang Mai Initiative. How this facility is viewed is heavily influenced by whether the observer takes a 'glass half full' or 'glass half empty' approach. From a positive perspective, the CMI is an unprecedented example of East Asia-wide cooperation in the field of finance, which links countries that today control the majority of the world's holdings of foreign exchange. From the 'half empty' perspective, the CMI has a total of only $83 billion at its disposal, and because it operates as sixteen bilateral swap agreements, the total amount of money available to an individual country in crisis is substantially less than that (the largest amounts, $13 billion, being available to Indonesia and Korea while other countries can draw on less than $10 billion). 53 These amounts are small in comparison with the foreign exchange holdings of many East Asian countries (especially those of China and Japan), and in comparison with the volume of daily flows in foreign exchange markets. Moreover, contrary to aspirations that an East Asian monetary fund would provide an alternative 53 In May 2007, ASEAN+3 finance ministers agreed in principle that the CMI should be multilateralised as a self-managed reserve pooling arrangements and called for in-depth studies of measures-such as surveillance and enforcement mechanisms, reserve eligibility, size of quotasrequired to effect this agreement. These studies have yet to be completed. Note, however, that the current arrangements link specific pairs of countries in agreements that have different terms, and participants can opt out of them at any time. Some of the initial swap agreements were not renewed when they expired.
to the IMF, countries are permitted to draw down only 20 per cent of the funds available to them through the CMI without entering into an IMF agreement. 54 The other principal outcome of ASEAN+3 financial cooperation has been the launching of a bond market initiative, the intention being to overcome over-dependence on bank lending, which many saw as a significant weakness of East Asian economies at the time of the crisis. Again, the results from this cooperation have been modest: ASEAN+3 launched six working groups to examine key issues relating to the issuance of bonds (including the operation of local and regional credit rating agencies) but to date no concrete action has emerged from the studies.
Just as a hierarchy exists in modes of trade cooperation, ranging from free trade areas to economic unions, in which each step progressively increases the constraints on governments' policy autonomy, so a similar ranking can be identified in financial cooperation as follows:
• Sharing of information;
• Currency swap arrangements;
• Coordinating the governance of local financial infrastructure;
• Adoption of common goals such as exchange rate stability; • Agreeing to adjust domestic policy to maintain exchange rate stability; and • Monetary union. 55 ASEAN+3 has not yet moved beyond the first two of these levels although the various studies conducted under its auspices have indicated strongly that further deepening of financial cooperation will require governments to give up some policy autonomy so as to establish common standards for the governance of their domestic financial infrastructure. 56 In short, while financial cooperation across East Asia is unprecedented, it is, as Jennifer Amyx concludes, currently more a matter of symbolism than of substance. 57 In the trade field, the results of cooperation on an East Asian-wide basis have been even more meagre despite the East Asia Vision Group's recommendation that an East Asian Free Trade Area be established, and its endorsement by the East Asia Study Group. Here a central problem has been the unwillingness/failure of the region's three largest economiesChina, Japan and Korea-to negotiate agreements amongst themselves. 58 One of the first preferential trade agreements to be proposed in the region post-financial crisis was between Japan and Korea-first mooted on a visit to Tokyo by Korean President Kim Dae Jung in October 1998, but a decade later the negotiations remain stalled. China and Japan have not even proposed to begin negotiations on a deal. Consequently, ASEAN has remained at the heart of ASEAN+3 trade negotiations, having now completed-with the signature of an agreement with Japan in April 2008-bilateral treaties with each of the Northeast Asian countries. Many of the agreements that have been negotiated have incomplete product coverage, complex rules of origin, and exclude the issues of 'deeper' integration on the WTO Plus agenda. They are expected, consequently to have minimal impact on aggregate trade or welfare in the region.
The current state of trade negotiations reflects a broader problem in ASEAN+3 cooperation-frequently it occurs as a series of ASEAN+1 agreements rather than integration on an ASEAN+3 basis. 59 Even when loosely coordinated under an ASEAN+3 umbrella, the projects most frequently are initiated and financed by one of the Plus Three countries with little or no input from the others, with the consequence that one has a series of 'Chinese', 'Japanese' and 'Korean' projects. At times the rivalry between China and Japan comes to the fore in proposing rival projects (although some might argue that in a best case scenario they will be 'complementary'). An instance is Mekong regional cooperation where Beijing and Tokyo have put forward alternative projects. 60 Rivalry between China and Japan has spilled over into alternative conceptualisations of the 'region' and to the establishment of regional institutions that are potential competitors for one another. The East Asia Vision Group had proposed that a formal process of summitry be established for the ASEAN+3 grouping. When its proposals, as vetted by the East Asia Study Group, were brought to the table for discussions in 2004, however, the Japanese government, supported by Singapore, argued that the EAS should include Australia, India, and New Zealand as well as the ASEAN+3 member states. The proposal was eventually accepted when Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono apparently ignored the recommendation of his foreign ministry and supported Japan and Singapore. 61 The creation of the EAS, the first meeting of which was held in 2005, and whose membership is identical to that proposed by Japan and Singapore, is the most obvious manifestation of ongoing tensions about how exclusive an East Asian region should be, and concerns on the part of some countries about the potential for China to dominate an ASEAN+3 grouping. The upshot is that East Asia now has two 'regionwide' groupings whose mandates overlap substantially. The second EAS, held in the Philippines in January 2007, identified five 'priority areas' for the EAS: energy, education, finance, avian influenza and natural disaster mitigation. All of these areas are listed under ASEAN+3 Cooperation; they also overlap with various working groups within APEC. The EAS has a study group considering the Japanese proposal for the formation of a comprehensive economic partnership in East Asia (including Australia, India and New Zealand) while APEC is studying a proposal for a Free Trade Agreement of the AsiaPacific. 63 At this time, it is unclear whether some division of labour will emerge amongst these regional institutions, whether a flexible architecture of cooperation will come into existence, or whether effective cooperation will be hampered by East Asia's new institutional alphabet soup.
HAS EAST ASIA BECOME MORE REGIONALISED?
Most commentators identified the increasing regionalisation of East Asia as a significant factor in the emergence of the ASEAN+3 grouping. 64 Has regionalisation since the financial crisis moved in a manner that would normally be conceived of as supportive of increasing regionalism? For the most part, the available evidence suggests not.
As is evident from Table 1 Moreover, the share of intra-regional trade in the total trade of East Asia states, after an initial spurt from 1990 to 1995, has not significantly increased (see Figure 1) . By 2006, the share was only one half of one percent higher than before the financial crisis. This is all the more remarkable given the extensive multiple counting of value-added that occurs within East Asia when components traverse national borders several times in the process of assembly within production networks. 66 Although substantial re-direction of trade within East Asia has occurred as China has emerged as the assembly plant to the world, 67 East Asia continues to rely very heavily on extra-regional markets for its exports (as China's share in the exports of other East Asian economies has risen, their share in its exports has fallen, with the US and the EU increasing in importance as export markets for China). 68 66 The data in Figure 1 refer to the ASEAN+3 countries. They exclude Hong Kong (which enjoys separate membership in the WTO even though it is now recognised to be part of China) and Taiwan. Inclusion of these two economies increases the share of intra-regional trade in total trade of East Asia to slightly over 54 per cent. To the extent that the share of intra-regional trade among ASEAN+3, Hong Kong and Taiwan has increased, it results almost exclusively from interactions involving Hong Kong and Taiwan, evident in the Table from A similar lack of increase in regionalisation is seen in the financial sphere. ASEAN+3 countries accounted for less than one-third of total ASEAN foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows over the years [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] ; the percentage actually fell during the years after 2002. In Northeast Asia, the share of intra-regional FDI was much smaller. And intra-regional portfolio asset holding as a share of total assets held by EAS members is smaller still-currently only 11 per cent. 69 Finally, to what extent are the aspirations to establish various 'communities' throughout the region contributing to the development of a greater sense of regional identity. The data collected by Roberts on the lack of trust within ASEAN has already been noted. A similar lack of sense of community is evident in survey data from Northeast Asia. When asked whether they thought of themselves as being part of a larger group that includes people from other countries, and offered the choice of European, Asian, Chinese, Islamic, Other or 'I do not think of myself in this way' as 
CONCLUSION
East Asia is undoubtedly more closely knit today than it has been at any time since the Second World War. 71 Regionalisation in key areas of trade and finance may have largely stalled since the mid-1990s, but in the decade since the financial crises a whole new architecture of regional institutions has been constructed. As Acharya has noted, the new regionalism has been driven as much by ideas and impulses as by functional necessities. The dominant ideas in the 1990s were often anxiety about developments elsewhere in the international system, and anger both at the perceived US indifference to the problems East Asian economies faced in 1997-98 and at the more general Western opposition to the development of exclusively East Asian institutions. 72 East Asian elites were able to turn the negative sentiments generated by the financial crisis into positive institutional outcomes through the diplomacy of the East Asia Vision Group. The institutions that have been constructed, however, mirror the deficiencies of those created under ASEAN's auspices. They are often little more than consultative forums. Cooperation remains shallow. Governments have seldom been willing to accept even the most modest of constraints on their autonomy in policymaking as the price of constructing East Asian institutions.
Institutional design does indeed matter. ASEAN's failure to agree on clearly-specified and enforceable obligations, or on effective dispute settlement mechanisms, illustrates the risk that mimicking the 'ASEAN way' will produce 'regional' institutions that are far less effective than others that East Asian states have entered into with extra-regional partners.
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